When encrypted privacy moves to the network layer, how does Zodl use OHTTP to hide "who you are" behind transactions?

Zcash wallet Zodl has begun migrating users to a new server architecture with version 3.20.0 that splits request handling via Oblivious HTTP (OHTTP), ensuring no single operator sees both a user's IP address and wallet request contents. Requests are encrypted for ZODL's gateway, routed through relays run by Cloudflare or Fastly that strip identifying headers, and padded to fixed size buckets (roughly 4 KB steps, with transaction broadcasts padded to 16 KB or higher) to prevent traffic analysis. The design matters because light wallets leak IP and timing metadata to lightwalletd servers even when on-chain ZEC transactions are fully shielded, and critics note the model assumes relay operators and ZODL never collude, with Cloudflare and Fastly subject to US legal subpoenas. ZODL contributor y4ss called OHTTP a better default but no substitute for Tor or Nym against nation-state adversaries, suggesting users can layer Tor on top. The rollout is being pushed to all users over the coming days, while Nym's mixnet is already integrated with Zcash wallets Zingo and Zkool and is in talks with Zodl.